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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST 
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND COMPULSORY 
SELF-DISCLOSURE UNDER THE CLEAN AIR 
AND CLEAN WATER ACTS 
O.A. Caginalp* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, environmental legislation has been passed by Con-
gress that requires extensive disclosure of information by polluters. 
Such disclosure, when used to exact penalties from the providers of 
the information raises potential conflicts with respect to the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The conflict arises 
when information received by the government pursuant to required 
notification or records under the applicable statute is used by the 
government to prove its case against the alleged polluter. Two 
statutes which authorize such use along with a self-reporting provi-
sion are the Clean Air Act! and the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA).2 
Under the Clean Water Act, the owner or operator of a facility 
from which oil or other hazardous material has been spilled must 
report to the authorities.3 Such a polluter then becomes subject to a 
mandatory civil penalty.' Other sections of the Clean Water Act5 
(dealing with effluent limitations) which are parallelled by corre-
sponding sections of the Clean Air Act6 provide for monitoring and 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7462 (Supp. III 1979). 
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA), is commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act. For the sake of simplicity, this 
article will refer to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as FWPCA or Clean Water Act. 
3. Clean Water Act, § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
4. [d. S 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6)_ 
5. [d. SS 301-308, 33 U.S.C. S§ 1311-1318. 
6. Clean Air Act, SS 112-114, 116, 120,42 U.S.C. SS 7412-7414, 7416, 7420 (Supp. III 1979). 
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recordkeeping by various persons who may later be subject to civil 
penalties for any violations. Under the statutes, information re-
ceived pursuant to such records may be used in the identification of 
violators and assessment of penalties. 
The validity of the Clean Water Act oil spill notification require-
ment along with its automatic civil penalty have spurred challenge 
on constitutional grounds since its inception.7 Litigants have com-
plained that the mandatory penalty is criminal in nature despite its 
statutory "civil" label, and that its assessment on the basis of infor-
mation gathered through compulsory self-reporting is barred by the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The fifth 
amendment states that "[ n]o person, . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... "8 The distinc-
tion between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of constitutional 
import because the self-incrimination clause is expressly limited to 
criminal cases. 
In June, 1980, the Supreme Court ruled, in United States v. 
Ward, 9 that the Clean Water Act penalty provision is civil in nature 
and therefore its imposition upon an individual on the basis of com-
pelled self-disclosure is constitutionally permissible. In so doing, the 
Court settled a split among the circuit courts and reversed the 
holding of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ward v. Coleman.l0 
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Ward contradicted three appellatell 
and several district12 courts. The Supreme Court in Ward has 
established a comprehensive framework of analysis which will doubt-
less be utilized in future cases involving a determination of the civil 
or criminal nature of a penalty. 
This article will first discuss the section of the Clean Water Act 
dealing with oil and hazardous substance discharges. A discussion of 
Ward will follow, focusing on the factors examined by the Supreme 
Court in its determination of the character of the penalty provision 
7. See Comment, Water Act's Oil Spill Notification Rule Survives Constitutional Challenge, 
6 ENVT'L L. REP. 10011 (1976). 
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
9. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
10. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979). 
11. See United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Allied Towing Corp., 578 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. 
Towing Co., ~37 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977). 
12. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 573 
F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1978); Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977); United States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934 (N.D.W.Va. 1976); United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975). 
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of section 311(bX6). Finally, a comparison of the Clean Water Act oil 
spill provision with sections of the Clean Air Act and the Clean 
Water Act effluent limitation sections will be presented. The effects 
which Ward may have on future litigation on that area will be con-
sidered. 
II. STATUTORY CONTEXT OF WARD 
The policy declaration of the Clean Water Act was revised 
substantially by the 1972 Amendments. These Amendments reflect 
the departure in federal water pollution control policy from a water 
quality standards control mechanism to a discharge control mech-
anism.1s The objective of the Act is to restore and maintain the 
natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's 
waters.14 In order to achieve its policy objectives, the Clean Water 
Act prohibits the discharge, in harmful quantities, of oil or hazardous 
substances into the navigable waters or onto the adjoining shorelines 
of the United States. Amounts which are deemed "harmful" shall be 
those determined by the President. 15 
Critical to the proper administration and enforcement scheme of 
the Act is section 311(bX5)16 which requires "any person in charge of 
a vessel or of an onshore facility or an off-shore facility" to notify the 
13. S. REp. No. 92-414 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
3678,3678. The former regulatory approach to water pollution control permitted a free use of 
water for'waste disposal up to a point of "unreasonableness" which was legally defined. Under 
that approach the enforcement authority had the burden of proving that discharges harm 
marine resources or deter other uses. The discharge control mechanism brought about by the 
1972 amendments has given effluent standards a dominant role with the water quality stand-
ards serving an important interstitial function. A flat prohibition is declared against "the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person," except where permitted under various provisions of 
the Act setting effluent standards. 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Whereas the 
former approach required an assessment of the harm to the environment, the new amendment 
requires only a determination that a non-permitted discharge is taking place. 
14. See note 13 supra. 
15. Clean Water Act S 3l1(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Presi-
dent, through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), defined harmful quantities as all 
oil discharges that violate water quality standards or "[c]ause a film or sheen upon or 
discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines or cause a sludge or emulsion 
to be deposited beneath the surface of the water or upon adjoining shorelines." 40 C.F.R. S 
110.3 (1980). 
16. Clean Water Act, S 3l1(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). This sec-
tion states in part: 
Any person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an offshore facility shall, 
as soon as he has knowledge of any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance from 
such vessel or facility in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection, immediately 
notify the appropriate ~ency of the United States Government of such discharge. 
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appropriate agency of the United States Government17 of the dis-
charge in violation of section 311(b)(3)18 immediately upon learning 
of the discharge. Should that person fail to make such a notification, 
he is liable for a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for not 
more than one year, or both.19 Section 311(b)(5) further contains a 
"use immunity" provision which states that information received 
pursuant to such notification shall not be used against any such per-
son in any criminal case except a prosecution for perjury or mis-
representation. 20 
Another section of the statute, 311(b)(6)(A), imposes a "manda-
tory" civil penalty of up to $5,000 for each offense on all discharges 
of oil and hazardous substances.21 This is a strict liability offense, for 
which there is no defense. The Coast Guard is the agency empowered 
to determine and collect the civil penalty.22 In determining the 
amount of the penalty, the factors which may be taken into account 
Any such person . . . who fails to notify immediately such agency of such discharge 
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more 
than one year, or both. Notification received pursuant to this paragraph or informa-
tion obtained by the exploitation of such notification shall not be used against such 
person in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false 
statement. 
17. The "appropriate agency" to notify encompasses" any federal agency concerned with 
water and environmental pollution or navigable waters." United States v. Kennecott Copper 
Corp., 523 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1975). A list of the appropriate persons to notify appears in 
33 C.F.R. S 153.203 (1980). 
18. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
19. See note 16 supra. 
20. [d. 
21. Clean Water Act S 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 
311(b)(6)(A) states in part: 
Any owner, operator, or person in charge of any onshore facility or offshore facility 
from which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of 
this subsection shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in 
which the Coast Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. Any 
owner, operator, or person in charge of any vessel from which oil or a hazardous 
substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3)(ii) of the subsection, and any 
owner, operator, or person in charge of a vessel from which oil or a hazardous 
substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3)(ii) who is otherwise subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States at the time of the discharge, shall be assessed a civil 
penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating of 
not more that $5,000 for each offense. . . . In determining the amount of the penal-
ty, or the amount agreed upon in compromise, the appropriateness of such penalty to 
the size of the business of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or 
operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the violation, shall be con-
sidered by such Secretary . . . . 
The penalty is mandatory since the Act states that a violator "shall" be assessed a civil penalty 
rather than "may." 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
22. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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include the appropriateness of such penalty to the size of the busi-
ness of the owner or operator charged, the effect on the owner or 
operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the 
violation . .23 The Coast Guard policy24 relating to enforcement of sec-
tion 311(b)(6) is that the penalty will be "at or near the maximum 
unless a lesser penalty is clearly justified by one of the factors listed 
in the [statute],"26 among which is the "gravity of the violation."26 
Coast Guard policy with respect to "gravity of violation" indicates 
that the factors to be taken into account in determining gravity in-
clude "the degree of culpability associated with [the violation], the 
prior record of the responsible party and the amount of the dis-
charge."27 Not to be considered in determining the amount of the 
penalty are any decisions by federal or state authorities to bring 
criminal charges, or any cleanup efforts by the violator. 28 
Section 311(c)(1)29 authorizes the President to act to remove or ar-
range for the removal of any oil or hazardous material discharged 
unless it is determined that such removal will be done properly by the 
operator or owner of the source of discharge. The cleanup provision 
of the Act, section 311(f), holds the owner or operator liable for ac-
tual costs incurred by the United States Government for the contain-
ment, removal, and dispersal of the discharge.30 Unlike section 
311(b)(6), section 311(f) does not impose strict liability upon the 
pollutor for the cleanup costs. Four defenses are available, namely, 
that the discharge was solely the result of (a) an act of God, (b) an act 
of war, (c) negligence on the part of the United States Government, 
or (d) an act or omission of another party.31 Furthermore, there are 
limitations placed on cleanup cost liability,32 which can be waived by 
the government if the United States can sustain the burden of show-
23. [d. 
24. The Coast Guard policy relating to assessment of civil penalties under § 311(b)(6) of the 
FWPCA was commended during the debates prior to the passage of the FWPCA amendments 
of 1972, and the statement of that policy is reprinted in the Congressional Record. 118 CONGo 
REC. 33757-58 (1972). 
25. [d. at 33758. 
26. Clean Water Act, § 311(b)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
27. 118 CONGo REC. 33758 (1972). 
28. [d. 
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
30. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) to (3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
32. The cleanup cost liability of the owner or operator of a vessel is $150 per gross ton or 
$250,000, which ever is greater, except for an inland oil barge, which is limited to $125 per 
gross ton or $125,000. An onshore or offshore facility is limited to cleanup cost liability of 
$50,000,000. The costs of removal of the spill include any costs or expenses incurred by the 
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ing that the discharge' 'was the result of willful negligence or willful 
misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the owner."33 
The above provisions of the Clean Water Act provide a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme incorporating both criminal and civil sanc-
tions to reimburse the government with respect to clean-up costs, 
and to provide protection for the public from spills of oil and other 
hazardous substances. When information obtained through the re-
quired notification provision34 is used in a proceeding to establish a 
civil penalty under section 311(bX6),36 an issue concerning possible 
fifth amendment privileges arises. 
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE 
CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION 
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in 
part that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself." This provision has been held ap-
plicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.36 The 
privilege against self-incrimination is conferred only upon individ-
uals-it is not available to a corporation,37 and is also denied to an un-
incorporated entity, such as a labor union38 or a partnership,39 if the 
enterprise in question represents group interests as opposed to pri-
vate or personal ones. The constitutional privilege is designed to 
shield natural persons from sovereign compulsion to give testimony 
that might subject them to criminal liability. 40 
Read literally, the constitutional language conferring the privilege 
against self-incrimination would apply only in criminal proceedings 
against the holder and, further, might be construed as protecting 
only incriminating statements that the government sought to elicit 
from the witness after he was sworn in as a witness. But the 
language has been read broadly, consistent with its underlying pur-
pose of preventing the government from compelling an individual to 
present evidence that may incriminate himself. To begin with, the 
government in the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a 
result of a discharge. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(f)(1) to (4) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
33. [d. S 311(f)(3), 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (f)(3). 
34. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
35. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
36. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
37. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (corporation). 
38. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944) (labor union). 
39. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974) (partnership). 
40. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, S 118 at 251 (2d ed. 1972). 
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privilege of the accused not to be a witness against himself has been 
construed.to confer a right to remain off the witness stand if the ac-
cused claims his privilege.41 He is thus able to avoid completely inter-
rogation in a criminal trial in which he is named defendant. Not only 
does the accused enjoy a right not to be called to the stand in criminal 
proceedings against him, but any witness may decline to answer any 
question that raises an appreciable danger of incriminating him in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. Where this latter component of the 
privilege is claimed, a judge must decide on the basis of the inter-
rogator's question and all the surrounding circumstances, whether 
the answer would tend to incriminate the witness-claimant. 
Thus it is crucial for a judge to determine whether the pending pro-
ceeding is criminal or civil in nature before arriving at his decision to 
deny or uphold the claimant's fifth amendment privilege. In suits in-
volving criminal sanctions, the fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination exists, while it is absent in civil penalty pro-
ceedings. A determination of whether the sanction involved is civil or 
criminal, therefore, becomes controlling on the question whether the 
privilege against self-incrimination may be asserted. 
The issue of the nature of a penalty has arisen in many cases where 
the defendant claims that because the penalty in question is criminal, 
he is entitled to the procedural safeguards present in criminal 
cases.42 The Supreme Court has described the task of attempting to 
discern whether a particular sanction is criminal or civil in nature as 
"extremely difficult and elusive of solution."43 Nonetheless, courts 
have isolated several factors in an attempt to resolve the question. 
Congressional labeling of a penalty as civil or criminal is not 
dispositive. The Supreme Court, in Trop v. Dulles,44 addressed the 
question whether procedural due process limitations were applicable 
to a statute45 depriving the petitioner of his citizenship. The Court 
concluded that Congress' view of the statute as nonpenal was not 
determinative of the issue.46 Similarly, in United States v. Constan-
tine,47 the Court observed that a penalty could not be converted into 
41. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, S 2268 at 406 (rev. ed. 1961). 
42. See text and notes at 44-83 infra. For a discussion of these procedural safeguards, see 
Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974). 
43. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). 
44. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
45. Nationality Act of 1940, S 401, 8 U.S.C. S 1481 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
46. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958). 
47. 296 U.S. 287 (1935). 
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a tax merely by labeling it as such.48 Constantine involved a "special 
excise tax" on retail dealers of liquor operating contrary to state 
law, which was invalidated as a usurpation of state powers. While 
the above cases are relevant to a determination of the nature of a 
statute, neither involved a fifth amendment issue. 
Inquiry into the nature of a statute as penal or civil has often 
focused on the purpose of the statute, using the considerations 
enumerated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 49 In Mendoza-
Martinez, the Supreme Court held invalid provisions permitting ex-
patriation for draft evasion "because in them Congress [had] plainly 
employed the sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment 
-for the offense of leaving or remaining outside the country to 
evade military service-without affording the procedural safe-
guards guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments."5o The Court 
further stated that if a sanction is punitive rather than regulatory, 
the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial are necessitated. In 
ascertaining whether the underlying purpose of a stature is penal or 
regulatory, the Court outlined the following considerations: 
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or 
restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, 
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior 
to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to 
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry . . . . 61 
The Mendoza-Martinez Court further noted that resort to these fac-
tors is not necessary when there is conclusive evidence that Con-
gress intended the statute in question to be punitive. 52 
In other cases, the courts have looked to legislative history to 
determine whether a forfeiture provision was meant to be criminal. 53 
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States,54 the 
48. [d. at 294. 
49. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
50. [d. at 165-66. 
51. [d. at 168-69 (citations omitted). 
52. [d. at 169. Note, however, that a congressional declaration that a sanction is not punitive 
is not conclusive either. See text at note 46 supra. 
53. See, e.g., Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 
630 (N.D. Ill. 1963); United States v. Futura, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D. Fla. 1972). 
54. 409 U.S. 232 (1972). 
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Court held that "the question whether a given sanction is civil or 
criminal is one of statutory construction."55 With respect to proof of 
congressional intent not apparent on the face of the statute, the 
Court has held that" only the clearest proof could suffice to establish 
the unconstitutionality of a statute on such ground."56 Litigants 
claiming entitlement to constitutional privileges afforded in criminal 
cases must therefore face a "clearest proof" standard in showing 
that the sanction in question is punitive in nature. 
Another doctrine places significance on the type of damage 
sought. Under this approach, if an action is authorized by statute in 
order to compensate for damages or loss by the government or socie-
ty, it is not criminal. But if suit is brought primarily to punish the 
defendant, it is criminal in nature. Application of this doctrine has 
led to conflicting results. An early case, Hepner v. United States, 57 
involved monetary penalties imposed for illegal importation of aliens 
into the United States under the Alien Immigration Act of March 3, 
1903.58 The petitioner argued that the judicial procedure for collec-
tion of the fine was essentially a criminal prosecution. The Supreme 
Court, in focusing on the procedure authorized for the collection of 
the penalty rather than the sanction itself, held that the government 
could recover a statutory penalty by way of a civil action. No asser-
tion was made, however, that the penalty was a means of reimburs-
ing the government for damages incurred. 59 
Other more recent cases have also found the proceedings to be civil 
in nature despite the fact that the sanctions involved had little to do 
with making the government whole for damages suffered. Helvering 
v. Mitchell60 involved the application of the double jeopardy clause to 
a civil proceeding for income tax fraud after a prior criminal acquit-
tal stemming from the same transaction. The defendant contended 
that the government's additional claim of 50 percent of deficiency 
(in addition to the amount of the deficiency) was primarily a punitive 
sanction and that assessment of the claim was therefore barred by 
the doctrine of double jeopardy. The Court held the doctrine of dou-
ble jeopardy inapplicable because the 50 percent addition to tax was 
55. [d. at 237. 
56. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). 
57. 213 U.S. 103 (1909). 
58. Act of March 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 55 4, 5, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214. Sections 4 and 5 
of this Act fixed a judicially imposed fine of $1,000 for violations. 
59. In fact, the language of the opinion implies that such a finding is not essential. Hepner v. 
United States, 213 U.S. 103, 106 (1909). 
60. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
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"proved primarily as a safeguard for the protection of the revenue 
and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of in-
vestigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud."61 A 
similar case, United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess,62 involved a sanc-
tion subjecting to civil liability those persons who had defrauded the 
United States Government. The Supreme Court held that persons 
who had previously been indicted and convicted for conspiracy to 
defraud the government were not subject to double jeopardy by a 
subsequent civil proceeding. The proceedings involved were held to 
be civil despite the fact that more than the precise amount of damage 
was recovered by the government.68 
Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States64 further illustrates that 
allegations of specific damages are not necessary for a determination 
that a statute is remedial. The petitioner, after pleading nolo con-
tendre to an indictment for fraudulent purchases of motor vehicles 
under the Surplus Property Act of 194466 and paying $25,000 in 
fines, was charged under civil provisions of the same Act. The Court 
held that double jeopardy was not available as a defense because the 
statute involved was remedial. The Supreme Court analogized the 
government's recovery there to recovery under contractual liqui-
dated damage provisions which fix compensation for anticipated 
10ss.66 It was further noted that the damages resulting from Rex 
Trailer Company's fraudulent purchase of trucks were impossible to 
ascertain, but that it was obvious that injury to the government 
resulted.67 
Another test for determining whether a civil penalty statute is 
criminal in nature is whether the activities which give rise to the civil 
sanction also gave rise to a criminal punishment. The fact that the 
behavior in question may give rise to criminal as well as civil 
penalties has been said to indicate the criminal nature of the 
penalty.68 However, the fact that a statute merely contains both a 
civil and a criminal sanction in separate sections does not render 
61. [d. at 401. 
62. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
63. [d. at 550. 
64. 350 U.S. 148 (1956). 
65. Act of June 30, 1949, Pub. L. No. 78-457, S 26(b)(1) (repealed June 30, 1949, 63 Stat. 
399). 
66. Rex Trailer Co. Inc. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 (1956). 
67. [d. 
68. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) ("special excise tax" levied on 
retail liquor dealers when they carried on business contrary to local state or municipal law); 
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both of the sanctions imposed criminal since "Congress may impose 
both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omis-
sion."69 The Court found it relevant, in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones 
v. United States,70 that the criminal and civil "sanctions were 
separate and distinct and were contained in different parts of the 
statutory scheme . . . in determining the character of the for-
feiture."71 By way of contrast, the Court in Boyd v. United States72 
held a forfeiture proceeding to be a criminal action for the purposes 
of the self-incrimination privilege. The Court based its opinion partly 
of the fact that the statute under scrutiny73 listed, in the same sec-
tion, forfeiture along with fine and imprisonment as one possible 
punishment for customs fraud. 
All of the above-mentioned cases shed some light on the various 
factors considered by the court in its determination of whether an ac-
tion is civil or criminal. None of those cases, with the exception of 
Boyd,76 dealt with compelled testimony and therefore did not direct-
ly involve the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Boyd, as well as Lees v. United States,76 indicate that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is more zealously guarded than are other 
procedural safeguards.77 Boyd was a proceeding, civil in form, for 
United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1931) ("tax" assessed in double the usual 
amount upon evidence of illegal liquor sale); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) 
("tax" imposed upon evidence of crime in dealing in liquor). 
69. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). 
70. 409 U.S. 232 (1972). 
71. [d. at 236. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 404 n.14 (1938) (citing Mitchell 
v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 1093, 1136 (1935»; "A careful study of the two sections convinces 
us that they are basically different in character and were enacted for wholly different pur-
poses. The language of the two sections differs widely and contemplates situations which may 
require entirely dissimilar proof." 
72. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
73. "Act to amend the customs revenue laws, and to repeal moieties," ch. 391, S 12, 18 Stat. 
186 (1874). 
74. Under the Act, a party found in violation of its provisions "shall be fined in any sum not 
exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not 
exceeding two years, or both; and in addition to such fine, such merchandise shall be for-
feited . . . ." [d. 
75. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
76. 150 U.S. 476 (1893). 
77. The privilege against self-incrimination has been said to embrace "proceedings to en-
force penalties and forfeitures as well as criminal prosecutions and is of broader scope than are 
the guaranties in Article III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials in criminal prosecu-
tions." United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 50 (1914) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt need 
not be established in an action of debt brought by the United States under the contract labor 
provisions of the Alien Immigration Act); see also United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 
481-82 (1896) (confrontation clause of the sixth amendment not extended to defendants in ac-
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the forfeiture of certain goods, imported illegally, under a statute78 
which provided for criminal penalties as well as forfeiture pro-
ceedings. The Court held that compulsion of the defendants to pro-
duce evidence in their possession offended both the fourth amend-
ment and the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the proceeding, thought technically 
civil, was of a "quasi-criminal" nature. 79 
Seven years later, the Supreme Court relied principally upon Boyd 
in its holding in Lees. 80 In that case, the Court held that a proceeding 
resulting in a "forfeit and penalty" of $1,000 for violation of an Act 
prohibiting the employment of aliens was sufficiently criminal to 
trigger the protections of the self-incrimination clause of the fifth 
amendment. The Supreme Court has applied Boyd more recently in 
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,81 and United States v. 
United States Coin and Currency,82 to proceedings involving the 
forfeiture of property for alleged criminal activity. Most recently, 
however, the Court has stated that "[s]everal of Boyd's express or 
implicit declarations have not stood the test of time."83 
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE WARD LITIGATION 
The facts in Ward can be stated quite briefly. In March, 1978, oil 
overflowed from an open-earth pit at a drilling site owned and 
operated by L.O. Ward as L.O. Ward Oil and Gas Operations, and 
flowed into Boggie Creek, Oklahoma, a tributary of the Arkansas 
River System. A report of the incident was submitted by Ward and 
received by the EPA in June, 1975. The report was referred to the 
Second U.S. Coast Guard District, the Commander of which as-
sessed a civil penalty of $500 against Ward pursuant to section 
tion to recover the value of merchandise forfeited to the United States); Hepner v. United 
States, 213 U.S. 103, 112 (1909) (in a civil action involving the Alien Immigration Act, the 
defendant could not be compelled to testify against himself in respect to any matter involving 
his being guilty of a criminal offense); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892)(fIfth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination extended to a case before the grand jury in a 
case involving alleged violation of an Act to Regulate Commerce). 
78. See notes 73-74 supra. 
79. 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). 
80. See note 76 supra. 
81. 380 U.S. 693 (1965). 
82. 401 U.S. 715 (1971). 
83. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976) (compelled production of documents 
relating to tax preparation in possession of attorneys held not to implicate the fIfth amend-
ment privilege which taxpayer-clients would have enjoyed from being themselves compelled to 
produce the documents). 
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311(bX6). Ward appealed the assessment to the Commander of the 
Coast Guard, but the appeal was denied. 
A. The District Court Decision 
In April, 1976, Ward brought action in U.S. District Court for in-
junctive and declaratory relief. Ward requested that the court 
declare unconstitutional and enjoin the enforcement of section 
311(b)(6) and other provisions of the FWPCA.84 At about the same 
time, the United States brought suit against Ward and L.O. Ward 
Oil and Gas Operations to collect the unpaid penalty. The action was 
consolidated for trial. 86 Ward argued that he was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law because the penalty imposed was criminal or 
quasi-criminal and thus the self-reporting provision violated the 
privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the fifth amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States.86 
The district court focused a great deal of attention on the question 
whether the sanction in the case was criminal or civil. While cogni-
zant that Congress had labelled the penalty provision of section 
311(bX6) as "civil," the district court expressed the need for inquiry 
beyond the face of the statute.87 In making such an inquiry, the court 
applied the criteria set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 88 
While the district court found the results of some of the Mendoza-
Martinez tests inconclusive, it was able to conclude on the basis of 
the others that the 311(b)(6) penalty is civil in nature. A civil penalty 
was indicated by the fact that only a monetary sanction is imposed 
and its collection effectuated through a civil procedure.89 Since there 
was no requirement of scienter, the court concluded that the penalty 
served a remedial function. 90 The court determined that the provi-
sions of the Act may promote the traditional criminal law aim of 
deterrence without being considered a criminal penalty.91 Further-
more, it was found that the purpose of the penalty is to defray the 
costs of the Act's administration and of clean-up expenses, in-
84. Specifically, those provisions were: 33 U.S.C. SS 1318, 1319, 1321 (1976 & Supp. III 
1979). 
85. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Ok!. 1976). 
86. [d. at 1354. 
87. [d. at 1355. 
88. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). For a discussion of these criteria, see text and notes at notes 49-52 
supra. 
89. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (W.D. Oklo 1976). 
90. [d. 
91. [d. 
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dicating its compensatory and remedial nature.92 Since persons who 
spill oil could be punished criminally under the Rivers and Harbors 
Act,98 the district court addressed the issue of parallel criminal sanc-
tions.94 The court cited two prior cases96 which have found the result 
of this test inconclusive. Next, the district court determined that the 
maximum penalty of $5,000 was not excessive when compared to the 
cost which could be incurred in removing harmful discharges.96 The 
fact that the penalty was not excessive was viewed by the court as a 
further sign of the remedial nature of the 311(b)(6) sanction. 
B. The Court of Appeals Decision 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed91 on the 
ground that the FWPCA's enforcement scheme violates the fifth 
amendment. Since it concluded that the penalty was sufficiently 
punitive to trigger fifth amendment protections, the court focused 
its inquiry on "whether the legislative aim in providing the sanction 
was to punish the individual for engaging in the activity involved or 
to regulate the activity in question."98 In making its determination 
92. Id. at 1357. 
93. 33 U.S.C. 55 407, 411 (1976). The Rivers and Harbors Act (Refuse Act) makes it a crime 
to discharge any refuse matter into the navigable waters of the United States without the per-
mission of the Army Corps of Engineers. Though enacted in 1899, the Act's sanctions were 
not applied to water pollution until the late 1960's because prior to that time it was thought 
that the Act applied only to deposits of refuse which impeded navigation and that industrial 
discharges fell under an exemption for refuse matter "flowing from streets and sewers and 
passing therefrom in a liquid state." See Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of 
Penalities in the Enforcerrumt of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 1 
(1977-78). 
94. For further discussion on this matter, see notes and text at notes 68-73 supra. 
95. United States v. General Motors Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1151 (D. Conn. 1975); United 
States v. Eureka Pipeline Co., 401 F. Supp. 934 (N.D.W.Va. 1975). The court in General 
Motors stated that although a criminal violation of the Refuse Act is similar to a violation of 
Clean Water Act § 311(b)(6), in that the element of scienter is not required. 
this does not transform the otherwise civil penalty into a criminal one. The factor of 
whether the act to which the sanction applies was already a crime points to the 
criminal nature of the sanction only where its function is to punish rather than 
regulate. In isolation, this factor leaves the civil or criminal nature of 5 1321(b)(6) am-
biguous. 
United States v. General Motors, 403 F. Supp. at 1163. The court reached a similar result in 
Eureka Pipeline where it stated, "[a]lthough the fact that the act for which a civil penalty may 
be imposed is also subject to criminal punishment may be an indication that the penalty is 
criminal, it is not determinative since Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction 
for the same act." 401 F. Supp. at 940 (citations omitted). 
96. Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Okl. 1976). 
97. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979). 
98. Id. at 1190 (quoting Telephone News-System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 220 F. 
Supp. 621, 630 (N.D. Ill. 1963». 
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as to the nature of the penalty, the Tenth Circuit considered the con-
gressional intent discernable from the face of the statute, the actual 
operation of the enforcement mechanism of the statute, and the in-
dications of congressional intent enumerated by the Supreme Court 
in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 99 
The court found that while evidence of congressional intent dis-
cernable from the face of the statute was indicative of punitive in-
tent, it was not, alone, sufficiently conclusive to warrant treating the 
penalty provision as criminal in nature. IOO The court noted that while 
the civil penalty assessed in section 311(bX6)IOI forms part of a 
"revolving fund"lo2 thus indicating its remedial nature, the statu-
tory language dealing with the automatic assessment of the amount 
of the penalty indicates a punitive intent. lOS The court noted, in par-
ticular, that the penalty is assessed in every case, without regard to 
fault and that no defenses are available. The factors used in deter-
mining the amount of the penaltyl04 were not, in the court's opinion, 
reasonably related to the purposes of the revolving fund. lo5 
In order to determine conclusively the nature of the section 
311(bX6) penalty, the court next turned to the administrative en-
forcement scheme. The court's characterization of the penalty as 
punitive was buttressed by its examination of the U.S. Coast Guard 
enforcement policy.lo6 The court paid particular attention to the 
following: 
99. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The Mendoza-Martinez Court did not explicitly state that 
the factors are indications of congressional intent, but rather that the factors help determine 
whether an act is penal or regulatory in character. However, both the Tenth Circuit in Ward, 
598 F.2d at 1190 and the court in Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v. Occupational S. & H. Rev. 
Com'n, 518 F.2d 990, 1000 (5th Cir. 1975), have applied those factors as indicating congres-
sional intent. 
100. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1979). 
101. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
102. Under the Clean Water Act, S 311(k), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(k) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), 
funds collected from the assessment of penalties under S 311(b)(6) are to be paid into a "revolv-
ing fund" together with "other funds received under this section" and any money ap-
propriated to the revolving fund by Congress. Money contained in the fund is to be used to 
finance the removal, containment, or dispersal of oil and hazardous substances discharged into 
navigable waters and to defray the costs of administering the Act. [d., S 311(c), 33 U.S.C. S 
1321(c). 
103. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1979). 
104. See notes and text at notes 21,24 supra. 
105. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 1979). 
106. The authority for assessment and collection of civil penalties pursuant to Clean Water 
Act, S 311(b)(6)(A) is vested in the United States Coast Guard. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(6)(A) (1976 
& Supp. III 1979). United States Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5922.11A (February 
23,1973) [reprinted in United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 377 F. Supp. 558, 568-70 
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1. the Coast Guard Commandant Instruction "requires the assess-
ment of a civil penalty for each discharge of oil;" 
2. Coast Guard policy assesses a penalty at or near the maximum 
unless a lesser penalty is clearly justified by one of the factors 
listed in section 311(bX6); 
3. the "degree of culpability," the "prior record" of the party and 
the "amount of the discharge" are considered in determining the 
gravity of the violation; and 
4. "substantial intentional discharges should result in severe 
penalties, as should cases of gross negligence." 
The court emphasized that the language of the Coast Guard Com-
mandant Instruction lacked any "remedial" tenor since these kinds 
of considerations-degree of culpability, prior record, and extent of 
damages-are those traditionally focused on in determining the ap-
propriate penalty in criminal cases. The court further noted that a 
party may not avoid or reduce the penalty by removing the dis-
charged oil, and that the costs of investigation are not considered in 
assessing the amount of the penalty.lo7 
The next factor examined by the Tenth Circuit was the application 
of the seven tests enumerated by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez,los noted above. lo9 While the court found the 
results of the first two tests of Mendoza-Martinez inconclusive,l1O 
the results of the succeeding five were held to indicate a criminal 
penalty in the case of the FWPCA section 311. The court found that: 
a) the factors in the Commandant Instruction used in determining 
the amount of the penalty indicate a scienter requirement;ll1 b) the 
statute promotes the traditional aims of punishment in that the 
penalties are based on such factors as the gravity of the violation, the 
degree of culpability, and the prior record of the party;112 c) the 
(E.D. La. 1974).] was promulgated to guide assessment of civil penalties under § 311(b)(6). The 
policy statement accompanying the Instruction indicates that 
[d. 
a number of considerations may be made in determining the gravity of a violation, 
such as the degree of culpability associated with the violation, the prior record of the 
responsible party, and the amount of the discharge. Substantial intentional 
discharges should result in severe penalties, as should cases of gross negligence and 
so on. 
107. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 1979). 
108. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
109. See text and notes at notes 49-52, 89-96 supra. 
110. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 1979). 
111. [d. 
112. [d. 
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behavior to which the penalty applies is already a crime113 under the 
Rivers and Harbors Act;114 d) the penalty may not rationally be 
related to any purpose other than punishment since the amount of 
the fine is not reasonably related to the extent of damage to the en-
vironment;115 e) the penalties may often be excessive, indicative of 
the penal nature of the Act, since fines are more highly correlated 
with the size of the business rather than with good faith in subse-
quent clean-up activities of the violator.116 
In concluding, the Tenth Circuit, while reluctant to set aside a 
statutory enforcement scheme created by Congress, felt bound to 
recognize and abide by the maxim that the privilege against self-
incrimination should be liberally construed.117 Having examined the 
language of the statute, the administrative enforcement scheme, and 
the indicators of congressional intent, the court concluded that the 
penalty found in 33 U.S.C. section 1321(bX6) was criminal in nature. 
It therefore reversed and remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. The court did not, however, strike down the self-
reporting requirements of section 1321(bX5) or the imposition of civil 
penalties under section 1321(bX6). It determined that it is per-
missable to assess civil penalties based on a discharge of oil or other 
hazardous substance under the Act, provided that the evidence used 
to establish the discharge is derived from a source wholly indepen-
dent of the compelled disclosure required by section 1321(bX5).118 
C. The Supreme Court Reversal 
The Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision written by Justice 
Rehnquist, reversed the Court of Appeals. 119 The Court addressed 
itself primarily to two questions. First, the Court examined whether 
Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism under section 
311(bX6)120 indicated a preference for either criminal or civil penalty, 
113. [d. at 1193-94. 
114. 33 u.s.c. § 407 (1976). 
115. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 1979). But note, however, that the 
court failed to bear in mind that the fine is based, among other considerations, upon the gravi-
ty of the violation. As note 106 supra indicates, the Coast Guard takes into account the amount 
of the discharge in determining the gravity of the violation. The amount of the discharge clear-
ly is related to damage caused to the environment and the cost of clean-up. 
116. Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 1979). 
117. [d. 
118. [d. 
119. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
376 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:359 
and second, where Congress has indicated intention to establish a 
civil penalty, whether the statutory scheme was so punitive as to 
negate that intention. 
As to its first inquiry, the Court found it "quite clear"121 that Con-
gress intended to impose a civil penalty upon persons in Ward's posi-
tion. The Court placed particular emphasis on the label "civil penal-
ty" which Congress gave the sanction authorized in section 
311(b)(6),122 and its placement with the criminal penalties set out in 
the immediately preceding paragraph.123 The Court reasoned that 
Congress, in drafting the statute, intended to allow imposition of 
penalties under section 311(b)(6) without extending the constitu-
tional protections accorded criminal defendants. 
The Court considered, next, whether, despite its manifest intent, 
the Act provided for sanctions that are so punitive as to warrant self-
incrimination protections. The Court indicated that "only the clear-
est proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a 
statute on such ground."124 In making this determination, the Court 
referred to the seven considerations enumerated in Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez. 126 Justice Rehnquist observed that the Mendoza-
Martinez considerations, while helpful, were neither exhaustive nor 
dispositive, and that only the fifth-a consideration of whether the 
behavior to which the penalty applies is already a crime-aided the 
respondent Ward.126 In view of the fact that Ward's conduct was a 
crime under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act,127 the Court 
noted that this consideration tended, at first blush, toward a finding 
that section 311(b)(6) is criminal in nature. It reasoned that "Con-
gress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to 
the same act or omission."128 Furthermore, the Court, in Helvering 
v. Mitchell129 had held as civil a 50 percent penalty for tax fraud, and 
found it quite significant that the Act in question (Revenue Act of 
1928) contained two separate and distinct provisions imposing sanc-
tions and that those sanctions appeared in different parts of the 
121. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
122. [d. 
123. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
124. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
125. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). See also text and notes at notes 49-55, 88-96, 108-116 
supra. 
126. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980). 
127. See note 93 supra. 
128. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980). 
129. 303 U.S. 391 (1938). 
1980] SELF-DISCLOSURE 377 
statute. l30 The Ward Court therefore found it significant that the 
civil penalties of one statute and the criminal penalties of another 
statute were enacted seventy years apart, a fact which tended to 
dilute the impact of the fIfth Mendoza-Martinez factor. In sum, while 
the Court found the factors set forth in Mendoza-Martinez to be rele-
vant, it determined that they are in no way sufficient to render un-
constitutional the classification of the section 311(b)(6) penalty as 
civil. l3l 
The fact that section 311(b)(6) does not trigger all the protections 
accorded a criminal defendant by the Constitution was not con-
sidered dispositive by the Court. Ward assertedl32 that the penalty 
was "quasi-criminal," that is, sufficiently penal in character to trig-
ger the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination, but 
not other constitutional protections. l33 In his argument on the 
"quasi-criminal" question, Ward relied principally upon Boyd v. 
United Statesl34 and later cases quoting its language. l35 Boyd dealt 
with defendants indicted for attempting to defraud the government 
of customs duties who filed a claim to recover the goods in question 
despite the pending indictment. The penalty provision of the rele-
vant statutel36 provided that a party found in violation of its provi-
sions was subject to a fine of up to $5,000 but no less than $50, or be 
imprisoned for up to two years, or both. In addition to the above, the 
merchandise involved was to be forfeited. During the trial, the de-
130. See also text at note 60 supra, for further discussion of Helvering. 
131. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250 (1980). 
132. Brief for Respondent at 31, United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
133. See text and notes at notes 76-83 supra. 
134. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
135. In Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1883), the Court relied primarily upon Boyd in 
holding that a proceeding resulting in a "forfeit and penalty" of $1,000 for violation of an act 
prohibiting the employment of aliens was sufficiently criminal to trigger the protections of the 
self-incrimination clause. The Court stated that, "[t]his, though an action civil in form, is un-
questionably criminal in its nature, and in such a case a defendant cannot be compelled to be a 
witness against himself. It is unnecessary to do more than to refer to the case of Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616." 150 U.S. at 480. More recently, in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. 
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) the Court applied Boyd to a proceeding brought by the 
State of Pennsylvania to secure the forfeiture of a car allegedly involved in the illegal 
transportation of liquor. In United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 
(1971), the Court dealt with the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination in a proceeding brought by the United States to secure forfeiture of 
$8,674 found in the possession of a gambler at the time of his arrest. The Court held that the 
fifth amendment privilege was properly invoked because the forfeiture statutes were intended 
to penalize persons involved in a criminal enterprise. 
136. "Act to amend the customs revenue laws and to repeal moieties," ch. 391, § 12, 18 
Stat. 186 (1874). 
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fendants were compelled to produce evidence in their possession. 
The Court held that this compulsion was an unreasonable search and 
seizure under the fourth amendment and violated the fifth amend-
ment self-incrimination clause, declaring that "proceedings insti-
tuted for the purpose of declaring forfeiture of a man's property by 
reason of offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in 
form, are in their nature criminal."131 The Court further reasoned 
that 
[als, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the 
commission of offenses against the law, are of this quasi-
criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of 
criminal proceedings for all the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment of the Constitution, and that portion of the Fifth Amend-
ment which declares that no person should be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .lS8 
In his argument,IS9 Ward attempted to apply Boyd to his case on 
the basis that an oil spill, prohibited by section 31l(b)(3)140 is an "of-
fense against the law"141 because of the language used in section 
31l(b)(6) which states: "the operator of any ... facility ... from 
which oil . . . is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) . . . shall 
be assessed a civil penalty . .. for each offense .... [Emphasis 
added].142 According to Ward, such language clearly indicates a 
penalty incurred by the commission of an offense against the law. 143 
Ward also bolstered his argument by stating that "[t]he common law 
tradition which afforded a broad and liberal application of the self-
incrimination privilege is . . . a part of our constitutional her-
itage,"I44 and cited several cases to prove this point.146 
The Supreme Court in Ward declined to follow the reasoning of 
Boyd and those cases which adopted Boyd's holding.146 Rather, the 
137. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-34 (1886). 
138. Id. at 634. 
139. Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 39. 
140. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(bX3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
141. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). 
142. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(bX6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
143. Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 39. 
144. Id. 
145. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); Miranda 
v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); 
IDimann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 
(1951); Heiveringv. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
146. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-254 (1980). 
1980] SELF-DISCLOSURE 379 
Court chose to adopt the reasoning of a case subsequent to Boyd 
which had stated, "[s]everal of Boyd's express or implicit declara-
tions have not stood the test of time."147 Furthermore, the Court 
distinguisked Ward from Boyd on three grounds. First, Boyd dealt 
with forfeiture of property which, unlike the monetary fine in Ward, 
had absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or 
to the cost of enforcing the law. The Court noted that the FWPCA 
penalty was much more analogous to traditional civil damages. Sec-
ond, in Boyd the statute under scrutiny listed forfeiture along with 
fine and imprisonment as one possible punishment for custom fraud 
while under the penalty challenged in Ward, the civil remedy and the 
criminal remedy were contained in statutes enacted seventy years 
apart. Third, there existed a danger, in Boyd, that the defendants 
would prejudice themselves with respect to later criminal pro-
ceedings whereas Ward was protected by section 311(bX5)148 which 
expressly provides that "notification received pursuant to this para-
graph or information obtained by the exploitation of such notifica-
tion shall not be used against any such person in any criminal case, 
except a prosecution for perjury or for giving a false statement."149 
Justice Rehnquist concluded that in view of the "overwhelming 
evidence that Congress intended to create a penalty civil in all 
respects and quite weak evidence of any countervailing punitive pur-
pose or effect,"150 the Court could not hold section 311(bX6)151 to 
create a criminal or "quasi-criminal" penalty. 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun took the position that 
consideration of all of the Mendoza-Martinez standards was war-
ranted because of the attention given them by the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 152 Justice Blackmun did not, however, agree with 
the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that none of the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors strongly supports a "civil" designation for a penalty pro-
ceeding under section 311(bX6).153 He concluded that while anyone 
of the factors considered by itself may not weigh heavily in favor of a 
"civil" designation, cumulatively they point significantly in that 
direction. 154 
147. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 407 (1976). 
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(bX5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
149. [d. 
150. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980). 
151. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(bX6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
152. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256 (1980). 
153. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(bX6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
154. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 256 (1980). 
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens focused on the question 
whether the compelled disclosure of information was designed to 
assist the government in imposing a penalty rather than furthering a 
valid regulatory purpose. Justice Stevens agreed with the Court of 
Appeals that the penalties under section 311(bX6) are not calculated 
to reimburse the government for the cost of cleaning of the spill, but 
rather to exact retribution for causing the spill.155 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 
While the Mendoza-Martinez factors have been widely used in 
determining whether a penalty is civil or criminal in nature, some 
aspects of the Mendoza-Martinez tests have been eroded. The 
Supreme Court, in its analysis of the nature of the Clean Water Act 
penalty attached relatively little weight to the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors in general, but concluded that they did provide some 
guidance.156 Of those factors, the Court focused principally on 
whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a 
crime, and whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Ward com-
mented that while the remaining Mendoza-Martinez factors merit 
discussion as well, one should assign "less weight to the role of 
scienter, the promotion of penal objectives, and the potential ex-
cessiveness of fines than did the Court of Appeals." 157 
In setting aside some of the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the 
Supreme Court in Ward set up a two-tiered line of inquiry which may 
be useful in future cases. First, the Court examined whether Con-
gress had expressed a preference for a civil rather than a criminal 
sanction, and second, where Congress has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, whether the sanctions are so punitive as to 
transform what was intended as a civil remedy into a criminal pen-
alty. 
In addressing the first question, the Supreme Court placed much 
emphasis upon Congress' labeling of the sanction as "civil," par-
155. [d. at 257-58. Justice Stevens pointed to the following factors which led him to such a 
conclusion. The owner or operator is liable for cleanup costs under § 311(f) and, in the event 
that the spill is determined to be "nonremovable," under § 311(bX2XB), for liquidated 
damages. Payment of these damages does not relieve the violator of liability for § 311(b)(6) 
penalties. He further reasoned that the Court of Appeals had correctly applied the factors 
enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez in reaching its conclusion that the penalty is criminal in 
nature. 
156. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980). 
157. [d. at 256. 
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ticularly in relation to its placement in the statute following the 
criminal penalty provision of the previous paragraph.16s The Court 
thus concluded its inquiry into congressional intent without further 
examination of this area, accepting the fact that Congress did not 
deem it necessary to extend to defendants under this section of the 
Clean Water Act the constitutional protections normally accorded 
criminal defendants. In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the 
Supreme Court did not conduct an in-depth analysis of congressional 
intent discernible from the face of the statute, the operation of en-
forcement scheme, and the indicators of congressional intent 
enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez. 
In responding to the second part of its inquiry-whether the sanc-
tion was so punitive as to transform the civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty-the Court posed two additional questions: whether the 
behavior or activity in question is already a crime, and whether the 
penalty under scrutiny is quasi-criminal. A conclusion that the activi-
ty is already a crime would indicate the criminal nature of the "civil" 
sanction, and a conclusion that the penalty is quasi-criminal would 
extend to a defendant the fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination without further constitutional privileges normally 
present in a criminal case. 
In a determination of whether the activity in question is already a 
crime, the Court found controlling the fact that the criminal penalty 
provision of the Refuse Act169 was entirely distinct from the civil 
sanction provision of the Clean Water Act, and enacted seventy 
years prior to it. Thus the Court in Ward, as well as in previous 
cases, held that Congress may place both criminal and civil sanctions 
in separate and distinct parts of the same statute clearly distinguish-
ing them,160 or may place such sanctions in different statutes. With 
respect to the activity in Ward already being a crime under the 
Refuse Act, the Supreme Court found it determinative that the civil 
158. The Court was referring to the fact that 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) discusses the criminal 
penalty associated with failure to give notice immediately of a discharge, whereas the 
paragraph immediately following that section, S 1321(b)(6), begins with a discussion of the civil 
penalty assessed against violators. 
159. See note 47 supra. 
160. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (Court held that acquittal of a 
charge of willful attempt to evade or defeat any tax imposed by the Revenue Act, which sub-
jects those convicted to fine and imprisonment under S 146 does not bar assessment and collec-
tion of 50 percent of total deficiency as penalty under S 293). See also One Lot Emerald Cut 
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1972) (Court held that acquittal under 18 U.S.C. 
S 545, placing a criminal penalty upon the failure to declare imported merchandise, did not bar 
forfeiture action under 19 U.S.C. S 1497). 
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and criminal sanctions are in separate statutes. In fact, the Court in 
the past upheld civil convictions based on a violation of a statute 
which contained, in separate sections (of the same statute), both a 
criminal and a civil sanction.161 
In deciding whether a penalty is quasi-criminal, the Court took into 
consideration three factors: the nature of the penalty, possible preju-
dice with respect to later criminal proceedings, and parallel criminal 
and civil sanctions. In cases where the penalty under question bears 
a reasonable relationship to the damage incurred by society or to the 
cost of enforcement, the Court indicated that it will not view the 
sanction as quasi-criminal.162 Such a correlation would tend toward a 
remedial rather than a punitive or retributive purpose. A statute 
which placed the defendant in a position that could cause him to prej-
udice himself in respect to later criminal cases would, in the Court's 
view, be a further indication that the statute is quasi-criminal. As the 
Ward Court indicated, inclusion of a use immunity clause, as in sec-
tion 3U(b)(5),163 would eliminate problems of prejudice. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
A. Civil vs. Criminal Penalties 
Civil penalties have been widely adopted in the field of en-
vironmental protection. Much environmental legislation now con-
tains provisions for civil penalties which may be assessed against 
those who violate either the acts or compliance orders issued 
thereunder.164 The purpose behind imposing civil, rather than 
criminal penalties has been to enable the prosecutor to escape the 
burdens imposed upon him by the constitutional protections afforded 
a criminal defendant.166 An additional purpose behind civil penalties 
is to avoid the stigma attached to criminal sanctions.166 These con-
161. See note 160 supra. 
162. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-54 (1980). 
163. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
164. Below is a list of selected statutes authorizing civil penalties: Marine Protection, 
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972,33 U.S.C. S 1415 (1976); Ports and Waterways Safety 
Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. S§ 1223-27 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Energy Reorganization Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 5801 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
6901 (1979). 
165. H. Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money 
Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies 2 (Nov. 17, 1972) (unpublished 
report on file at CfYNI£ll Law Review), cited in Charney, The Needfor Constitutional Protec-
tions for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 480 (1974). 
166. H. Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil Money 
Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies 1 (Nov. 17, 1972) (unpublished 
1980] SELF-DISCLOSURE 383 
stitutional protections include the procedural safeguards of criminal 
due process, including trial by jury and the presumption of innocence 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Such safeguards are 
absent in proceedings involving civil rather than criminal penalties. 
The principle distinguishing feature between civil and criminal 
penalties has traditionally been their purpose: civil penalties are 
"remedial" while criminal penalties are "punitive."167 Many cases to 
date have involved determinations whether a penalty is to be treated 
as civil or criminal.16s Numerous cases have isolated individual fac-
tors in an attempt to answer that question,169 whereas others have 
considered a number of factors. 170 
B. The Clean Air Act and the Effluent Limitation 
Sections o/the Clean Water Act 
An act similar to the Clean Water Act in terms of fifth amendment 
considerations is the Clean Air Act. l71 This Act contains reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements and these records may be used by 
the Administrator of the EPA to assure compliance with the Act's 
effluent limitation standards. 
While the Clean Air Act is divided into three subchapters, only the 
first subchapter, that covering the subject of stationary sources of 
pollution will be examined here, since it alone presents a fifth amend-
ment issue.172 An expressed purpose of the Clean Air Act is "to pro-
report on file at Boston University Law Review), cited in Dietz, Compelled Self-Disclosure and 
Civil Penalties: The Limits of Corporate Immunity in Oil Spill Cases, 55 B.U. L. REV. 112, 
112 (1975). 
167. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972); Helvering v. 
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-401 (1938); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-65 
(1963). 
168. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Helvering v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391 (1938); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones 
v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Rex Trailer 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See also, text 
and notes at notes 42-83 supra. 
169. See cases discussed in Charney, The Needfor Constitutional Protections for Defendants 
in Civil Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478,492-514 & nn.90-171 (1974). In this article, Charney 
reviews and evaluates the factors used by the courts. Charney finds particularly distressing 
the deference by the courts to Congress in determining whether a sanction is civil or criminal. 
He feels that although such an approach appears to carry out congressional purpose, it avoids 
the issue of whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. Charney argues that 
congressional labelling should not be determinative of such a question. 
170. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
171. 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7462 (Supp. 1111979). 
172. 42 U.S.C. subch. I, SS 7401-7508 covers generally the subject of stationary sources of 
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tect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to 
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of 
its population."173 
Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the EPA is to 
establish nationwide ambient air quality control regions in any area 
which he deems appropriateY' Each state must in turn develop a 
state implementation program (SIP) to control the level of air pollu-
tion which complies with certain minimum national standards sub-
ject to the approval of the Administrator.176 Each SIP must provide 
for the achievement of national ambient air quality standards as set 
by the Administrator.176 Such plans, once approved, are enforceable 
by either the State or the Administrator; 177 
The enforcement provisions of the Clean Air Act, together with 
the civil penalty provisions embodied therein, are similar in effect to 
those of the Clean Water Act.178 Under section 111(e) of the Clean 
Air Act, it is unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source 
to operate in violation of a standard of performance. 179 With respect 
to existing stationary sources, section 112 of the Clean Air Act is ap-
plicable.180 Under that section, no air pollutant may be emitted by 
any stationary source in violation of the applicable emission stand-
ard, nor may any person construct any new source or modify anyex-
isting source which, in the administrator's judgment, will emit an air 
pollutant to which such standard applies.181 Enforcement of the pro-
pollution; Id. at subch. II, SS 7521-7574 deals with emissions from mobile sources; Id. at subch. 
III, SS 7601-7642 covers administrative and general provisions. 
173. Clean Air Act, S 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7401(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
174. Id. S 107(c), 42 U.S.C. S 7407(c). 
175. Id. S 110,42 U.S.C. S 7410. 
176. Id. S 112(d), 42 U.S.C. S 7412(d). 
177. Id. §§ 110-114, 42 U.S.C. SS 7410-7414. 
178. See text and notes at notes 21-40 supra. 
179. 42 U.S.C. S 7411(e) (Supp. III 1979). A "new source" means "any stationary source, 
the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations 
... [40 Fed. Reg. 53,346 (1975») prescribing a standard of performance under this section 
which will be applicable to such source." Clean Air Act § 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. S 7411(a)(2) 
(Supp. III 1979). A "standard of performance" which the Administrator issues a new source 
under the Act is "a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emis-
sion limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction 
which ... the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated." Id. S 111(a)(1), 
42 U.S.C. S 7411(a)(1). 
180. 42 U.S.C. S 7412 (Supp. III 1979). Under this section, stationary source has the same 
meaning as under S 7411(a). Under S 7411(a), a stationary source is "any building, structure, 
facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." Id. 
'181. Clean Air Act, S 112(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7412(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
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visions of this section may be accomplished by the state via its own 
procedure, or by the Administrator of the EP A.182 
In an effort to determine whether any person is in violation of any 
requirement of a SIP or any emission standard, the Administrator 
may require the owner or operator to install monitoring equipment 
and submit reports183 and may exercise a right of entry to copy 
records, sample emissions and inspect monitoring equipment.184 
Under section 114(b)(1),186 the state may develop and submit to the 
Administrator a procedure for carrying out this section in that state. 
If the Administrator finds the state procedure to be adequate, he 
may delegate to such state any authority he has to carry out this sec-
tion.186 
In determining whether the state procedure is adequate, EPA 
regulations require that the state plan demonstrate an authority to 
compel self-reporting of emissions and public disclosure of what is re-
quired.187 It is evident from the regulations that the EPA regards a 
primary purpose of section 114 to be aiding in the identification of 
violators of the SIP .188 
Whenever on the basis of information available to him, the EPA 
Administrator under section 113189 finds that a person is in violation 
182. Id. S 112(d)(I)-(2), 42 u.s.C. S 7412(d)(I)-(2). 
183. Id. § 114(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a)(l) states that the Administrator may require 
any person who owns or operates any emission source or who is subject to any re-
quirement of this chapter . . . to (A) establish and maintain such records, (B) make 
such reports, (C) install, use, and maintain such monitoring equipment or methods, 
(D) sample such emissions (in accordance with such methods, at such locations, at 
such intervals, and in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe), and (E) pro-
vide such other information as he may reasonably require . . . . 
184. Id. S 114(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2) states that: 
The Administrator or his authorized representative, upon presentation of his creden· 
tials-(A) shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any premises of such person 
or in which any records required to be maintained under paragraph (1) of this section 
are located, and (B) may at reasonable times have access to and copy any records, in-
spect any monitoring equipment or method required under paragraph (1) and sample 
any emissions which such person is required to sample under paragraph (1). 
185. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(b)(1) (Supp. 1111979). 
186. Id. 
187. 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(6) (1980). 
188. The regulation states: 
Id. 
(a) Each plan shall show that the state has legal authority to carry out the plan, in-
cluding authority to: . . . (5) Obtain information necessary to determine whether air 
pollution sources are in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and standards, 
including authority to require recordkeeping and to make inspections and conduct 
tests of air pollution sources . . . . 
189. 42 U.S.C. S 7413 (Supp. 1111979). 
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of any requirement of any implementation plan or is in violation of 
section 111(e),190 section 112(c),191 section 119(g),192 or section 
114,193 he may issue an order requiring compliance or he may bring a 
civil action in accordance with section 113(b).194 Under this second 
option, the Administrator may commence a civil action for a perma-
nent or temporary injunction, or assess and recover a civil penalty of 
not more than $25,000 per day of violation of any provision as stated 
above. The Administrator may then commence a civil action for 
recovery of the non-compliance penalty and a non-payment penalty 
under section 120.196 In determining the amount of the civil penalty 
the courts are to 
take into account such factors as the size of the business, the 
economic impact of the penalty on the business, and the 
seriousness of the violation (i.e. the degree to which any emis-
sion limit was exceeded and the duration and frequency of any 
such violation, rather than its air quality impact or its direct 
adverse health effect).196 
In addition to the above penalty, the Clean Air Act contains 
another enforcement provision in the form of a mandatory "non-
compliance penalty."197 Under this section, the State or the Ad-
ministrator may assess a penalty based on the economic value to the 
violator of costs foregone by the violator as a result of non-
compliance.198 The rationale behind this provision is to offset any 
possible economic gain which a delay in compliance may result in to 
the polluter along with any possible competitive advantage over 
those in compliance.199 
Whereas the above civil penalties may be assessed against any per-
son in violation of the provisions of the Clean Air Act, criminal sanc-
tions may be imposed only upon a showing of some conscious wrong-
190. [d. S 7411(e) relates to new source performance standards. 
191. [d. S 7412(c) relates to standards for hazardous emissions. 
192. Section 119(g) as in effect before August 7,1977 related to energy-related authorities, 
42 U.S.C. S 7419(g) (repealed 1977). 
193. 42 U.S.C. S 7414 (Supp. III 1979) relates to reporting requirements and inspections, 
etc. 
194. [d. S 7413(b). 
195. [d. S 7420. 
196. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077, 1147-48. 
197. Clean Air Act, S 120, 42 U.S.C. S 7420 (Supp. III 1979). 
198. [d. 120(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. S 7420(d)(2)(A). 
199. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1077,1155. 
1980] SELF-DISCLOSURE 387 
doing. A person who "knowingly" violates the provisions of the 
Clean Air Act200 is subject to a fine of not more than $25,000 per day 
of violation or by imprisonment of not more than one year, or by 
both.201The Act also provides for a $10,000 fine and/or six months 
imprisonment for any person who knowingly makes a false state-
ment in any required document or tampers with any required 
monitoring device. 202 
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act, in contrast with subchapter I 
of the Clean Air Act, deals with discharges of oil and hazardous mat-
ter which are either accidental or infrequent, rather than of a contin-
uing nature. Sections 301,203 302,204 303,206 304,206 306,201 and 307208 
of the Clean Water Act deal with an ongoing discharge, effluent 
limitations, and a discharge permit system similar to those under the 
Clean Air Act. The Clean Water Act effluent limitation provisions 
are monitored under a recordkeeping and reporting provision209 and 
enforced through compliance orders,210 criminal penalties,211 and 
civil penalties212 as are those provisions under subchapter I of the 
Clean Air Act. While there are some differences between the en-
forcement213 and recordkeeping requirements of the Clean Water 
Act effluent limitation provisions and those of the Clean Air Act, the 
two Acts may be treated alike for fifth amendment purposes. 
The same fifth amendment challenge which was made in Ward 
may also be made with respect to subchapter I of the Clean Air Act 
and sections 308 and 309 of the Clean Water Act. While section 311 
of the Clean Water Act may appear quite different from the sections 
200. See text and notes at 88-92 supra. 
201. Clean Air Act, S 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). This section further 
states that if the conviction is for a violation committed after the first conviction of such per-
son under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of 
violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or by both. 
202. [d. S 113(c)(2), 42 u.S.C. S 7413(c)(2). 
203. 33 U.S.C. S 1311 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (effluent limitations). 
204. [d. S 1312 (water quality related effluent limitations). 
205. [d. S 1313 (water quality standards and implementation plans). 
206. [d. S 1314 (information and guidelines). 
207. [d. § 1316 (national standards of performance). 
208. [d. S 1317 (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards). 
209. Clean Water Act, S 308, 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
210. [d. S 309(a)(6), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(a)(6). 
211. [d. S 309(c), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(c). 
212. [d. S 309(d), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d). 
213. The Clean Water Act contains no mandatory non-compliance penalty as found in the 
Clean Air Act, S 120, 42 U.S.C. S 7420 (Supp. III 1979). 
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dealing with effluent limitations of the Clean Air and Clean Water 
Acts, the fIfth amendment issues are the same. 
C. A Comparison of Section 311 of the Clean Water Act 
with the Clean Air Act and the Effluent Limitation 
Sections of the Clean Water Act 
It is apparent that the regulatory schemes under the Clean Air Act 
provisions and the Clean Water Act effluent limitation sections are 
similar in many respects to that of the Clean Water Act oil spill sec-
tion.214 Each defines explicitly the nature of the prohibited 
actions.216 A reporting requirement is present in both the oil spill 
section and the effluent limitation section of the Clean Water Act as 
well as in the Clean Air Act. Under FWPCA section 311, one who 
discharges hazardous substances must notify the appropriate agen-
cy,216 while under the Clean Air Act and FWPCA section 308, rec-
ordkeeping and reporting provisions are set out.217 Each insures 
compliance with its reporting provisions by imposing fines for failure 
to report or notify. 218 The major difference in these provisions is that 
although the FWPCA notifIcation provision contains a "use immuni-
ty" clause, a similar clause is absent from the corresponding Clean 
Air Act provision and FWPCA effluent limitation sections. A person 
who provides information under Clean Air Act section 114, or under 
FWPCA section 308 may be liable for a criminal penalty if his viola-
tion was "knowingly" made.219 
The enforcement provisions of FWPCA section 311 as well as 
FWPCA section 309 and Clean Air Act section 113 imposes high 
maximum fInes without any scienter requirement. The Clean Air Act 
214. Clean Water Act, S 311, 33 U.S.C. S 1321 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
215. Compare Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) 
with Clean Air Act, SS 111-112,42 U.S.C. SS 7511-7512 (Supp. III 1979), and Clean Water Act 
S 301(a), 33 U.S.C. S 1311(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
216. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
217. Clean Air Act, S 114(a), 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a) (Supp. III 1979); Clean Water Act, S 308, 
33 U.S.C. S 1318 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
218. Under the Clean Air Act oil spill liability section, failure to notify may result in a fine of 
up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment of up to one year. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. S 
1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator may assess a 
civil penalty of up to $25,000 per day for violations of the recordkeeping provisions. Clean Air 
Act, S 113(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(b)(4) (Supp. III 1979). Under the FWPCA effluent limitation 
sections, violations of the recordkeeping provisions are subject to a penalty of up to $10,000 
per day of violation. Clean Air Act, S 309(d), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
219. Clean Air Act, S 113(c)(I), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(c)(l) (Supp. III 1979); Clean Water Act, S 
309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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and the effluent limitation sections of the FWPCA imposes an addi-
tional criminal sentence upon persons who knowingly engage in such 
violations, while section 311 of the Clean Water Act draws no such 
distinction.220 
While the fifth amendment issue under the Clean Air Act and the 
FWPCA effluent limitation sections are quite similar to that under 
the Clean Water Act oil spill section, there are, of course, differences 
in the regulatory and enforcement schemes. Those differences are 
largely attributable to the fact that the activities governed are dif-
ferent in nature. One distinction is that the provisions of section 311 
of the FWPCA deal with the discharge of hazardous substances or 
oil which takes place at a more or less specific point in time rather 
than with an ongoing process of emissions into the air as in the Clean 
Air Act and effluent limitation sections of the FWPCA. This dif-
ference is evidenced by the fact that the Clean Water Act civil penal-
ty applies to "each offense"221 whereas the Clean Air Act and 
FWPCA section 309 civil penalties are assessed in terms of "per day 
of violation."222 
The reporting requirements of these provisions are different as 
well. The notification requirement of the Clean Water Act oil spill 
section is limited merely to making a report of the discharge as soon 
as the owner or operator of the facility has such knowledge. 223 
Reporting requirements under the Clean Air Act and the Clean 
Water Act effluent limitation sections are more of an ongoing proc-
ess dealing with day-to-day compliance with applicable emission re-
quirements. Furthermore, the reporting requirements of the latter 
are far more burdensome as they include a provision for monitoring 
equipment, emission samples, right of entry of the Administrator, 
and other information in order to determine compliance with the 
Act's sections. 
While there are differences, it is clear that the reporting and civil 
penalty provisions of the Clean Air Act as well as section 308 of the 
Clean Water Act are analogous to the sections of the Clean Water 
Act examined in United States v. Ward. 224 It is therefore conceivable 
220. Compare Clean Air Act, § 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(1976 & Supp. III 1979) with 
Clean Air Act, S 113(c)(I), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(c)(l) (Supp. III 1979) and Clean Water Act, S 
309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
221. Clean Water Act, S 311(b)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
222. Clean Air Act, S 113(b), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(b) (Supp. III 1979); Clean Water Act, S 
309(d), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
223. Clean Water Act, § 311(b)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
224. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
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that a challenge to the Clean Air Act may arise, under a claim of 
violation of the fifth amendment protections against self-
incrimination.226 Such a challenge might arise from a conviction 
under either the criminal penalty provision or the civil sanction pro-
VISIOn. 
D. Clean A ir Act Criminal Penalty 
A significant feature of the Clean Air Act is that a violation know-
ingly committed subjects the violator to a criminal sanction which 
could result in a $25,000 per day fine as well as one year of imprison-
ment. 226 A person is required, under the Act, to provide information 
that may incriminate him under a provision imposing criminal sanc-
tions. While the purpose of the recordkeeping requirements as 
asserted by the EPA is to insure compliance with the Standard of 
Performance and to identify violators, there is nothing in the statute 
to prevent such information from being used in a criminal action 
against the party. In contrast to section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 
the Clean Air Act contains no use immunity protection to prevent a 
defendant from being prejudiced in a criminal case. A court consider-
ing a conviction under the Clean Air Act criminal penalty provision 
should therefore hold such a conviction invalid if it was based on in-
formation obtained through the self-reporting and recordkeeping 
scheme of the Act.227 
E. Clean A ir Act Civil Penalty and the 
Required-Records Doctrine 
The distinguishing feature between the reporting required in 
Ward, and that under the Clean Air Act is that the Clean Air Act 
deals with recordkeeping requirements. The self-reporting provi-
sions of the Clean Water Act considered in Ward are triggered by 
specific, non-routine events which lead to penalties. A litigant 
challenging the Clean Air Act therefore faces an obstacle not pre-
sent in Ward, since the Supreme Court, has, in the past rejected fifth 
amendment challenges to routine recordkeeping requirements of 
other statutes. The refusal to allow fifth amendment protections in 
225. Research into this area has revealed that the fIfth amendment issue has not been 
litigated with respect to the Clean Air Act. 
226. Clean Water Act, S 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). A similar provi-
sion appears in Clean Water Act, S 309(c), 33 U.S.C. S 1319(c) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
227. See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. UIiited States, 390 
U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
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required reporting cases has led to the "required-records" doctrine. 
The Court, in Shapiro v. United States,228 held that the privilege 
which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained in relation to 
"records required by law to be kept in order that there may be 
suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate sub-
jects of governmental regulation and enforcement of restrictions 
validly established." 229 
The "required-records" doctrine, however, has been overturned 
by the Court in a number of cases dealing with statutes aimed at ex-
tracting information from members of the Communist Party (Albert-
son v. Subversive Activities Control Boarfi),230 gamblers (Marchetti 
v. United States),231 owners of firearms (Haynes v. United States),232 
and dealers in drugs (Leary v. United States).233 In those cases, the 
Court concluded that the reporting requirements were aimed at a 
highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities, 
rather than members of the general public and that application of the 
required-records doctrine was not warranted. Shapiro was 
distinguished on the ground that the statute under challenge re-
quired the petitioner to "preserve for examination" various records 
"of the same kind as he customarily kept. . . "234 whereas the cases 
involving select groups required reporting of information which may 
228. 335 u.s. 1 (1948). In Shapiro, the petitioner, a wholesale fresh produce dealer, was 
subject to the Wartime Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (50 u.s.c. App. S 901-946) 
(omitted from Code as terminated). Regulations promulgated under the Act required that 
anyone subject to the Act "preserve for examination by the Office of Price Administration all 
his records, including invoices, sales tickets, cash receipts, or other written evidences of sale or 
delivery ... and that he keep records of the kind he customarily had kept." In response to a 
subpoena duces tecum, petitioner produced the materials required by the Act. When he was 
subsequently prosecuted for violation of the Act, he asserted as a plea in bar that the com-
pulsory production of the materials had given him immunity, or, if no such immunity had been 
granted, that the statute under which he was prosecuted was unconstitutional. In rejecting his 
argument, the Court held that production of the material in issue could constitutionally be re-
quired of petitioner by the government without granting him immunity from prosecution or 
from its use. Although acknowledging limits on the government's right to require the keeping 
of records which must be made available to government investigators, the Court declared that 
"no serious misgivings that those bounds have been overstepped would appear to be evoked 
when there is a sufficient relation between the activity sought to be regulated and the public 
concern .... " 335 U.S. at 32. 
229. Id. at 17. 
230. 382 U.S. 70 (1965). 
231. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
232. 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
233. 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
234. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 57 (1968) (quoting Shapiro v. United States, 
335 U.S. 1 (1948». 
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or may not have been maintained. Records required under the Clean 
Air Act also seem to fall in this latter category as the EPA may re-
quire the operator or owner of an emission source to maintain 
records (regardless of whether the operator customarily kept such 
records), install and maintain monitoring equipment or methods, and 
to sample emissions in accordance with such methods.236 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of required records with 
respect to a California hit-and-run statute in the leading case of 
California v. Byers. 236 The issue there was the validity of the state 
hit-and-run statute requiring any driver involved in an accident 
resulting in property damage to stop at the scene and leave his name 
and address. The Supreme Court held the statutory scheme to be 
valid since under the test enunciated in Albertson, Marchetti, 
Haynes, and Leary,237 drivers involved in accidents were not a 
"highly selective" group or "inherently suspect of criminal ac-
tivities."238 The Court noted further that "the statutory purpose is 
non-criminal and self-reporting is indispensable to its fulfillment."239 
In reaching its decision, the Court also considered the fact that the 
statute merely required disclosure of name and address, an act which 
it considered as essentially neutral. 
The Clean Air Act's recordkeeping requirements are similar in 
some respects to the self-reporting requirement upheld in Byers. In 
both cases, there is a risk of self-incrimination. In both, one finds a 
primary non-criminal government purpose for requiring self-
reporting. In Byers, it was insuring a system of financial responsibili-
ty for automobile accidents; in the Clean Air Act, it is to insure com-
pliance with pollution standards. Furthermore, in both, self-report-
ing is essential to achievement of the non-criminal purpose. 
While analogies may be drawn between the reporting required in 
Byers and that in the Clean Air Act, the Clean Air Act provisions are 
distinguishable in some important respects. First, it is debatable 
whether the persons charged with the reporting requirements are 
members of the public at large. It may be argued that they are a 
"highly selective group" as were the defendants in Albertson, 
Marchetti, Haynes, and Leary, although they are not suspect of 
235. Clean Air Act, S 114(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. S 7414(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
236. 402 U.S. 424 (1971). 
237. See notes 230-33 supra. 
238. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
239. Id. at 431. 
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criminal activities. Second, the Clean Air Act recordkeeping is for 
the purpose of insuring compliance with the provisions of the Act 
and to aid in the identification of its violators. This is in contrast to 
the California hit-and-run statute which was designed to promote the 
satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents. 
Third, the Clean Air Act places upon the operator of an emission 
source a much heavier burden than merely reporting his name and 
address. It gives the Administrator of the EPA wide ranging 
authority to gather information from such an operator. As men-
tioned previously, such information is to be distinguished from 
records which are customarily kept. 
F. Ward Reasoning Applied to a Challenge 
to the Clean Air Act 
If a litigant challenging the Clean Air Act penalty provision were 
able to distinguish successfully his case from Byers on the grounds 
noted above, he would then be faced essentially with a problem 
similar to that considered in Ward. Following the Ward reasoning, a 
court would make a two-tiered inquiry into the question of criminal 
versus civil sanctions. It would consider first whether Congress ex-
pressed a preference for one label over the other, and second, where 
Congress had indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, 
whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or 
effect to negate that intention. A court considering the validity of 
the civil penalty scheme of the Clean Air Act240 should follow the 
Ward reasoning and hold those provisions constitutionally valid. 
It is clear that in the case of the Clean Air Act, Congress intended 
a civil penalty. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Clean Air 
Act suggests a remedial purpose in that it attempts to render non-
compliance more costly than investment in pollution control and the 
fact that the noncompliance penalty is based on the economic value 
of costs foregone by the violator as a result of noncompliance.241 
In the second part of its inquiry, a court applying the Ward reason-
ing to the Clean Air Act would essentially address whether the 
penalty in question is quasi-criminal. The Ward Court, in deciding 
this issue examined three factors: the nature of the penalty, possible 
prejudice with respect to later proceedings, and whether the activity 
in question is already a crime. As previously noted, the legislative 
240. Clean Air Act, S 113(b), 42 U.S.C. S 7413(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
241. See text and notes at 197-99 supra. 
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history of the Clean Air Act tends to indicate a remedial rather than 
a punitive intent.242 Since the seriousness of the violation is taken in-
to account as well as the costs saved by noncompliance, the penalty 
bears a reasonable relationship to the damage incurred by society. 
As the activity in question is not already a crime, the first two fac-
tors indicate that the civil penalties are not quasi-criminal. With 
respect to the third factor, it is possible for a defendant to prejudice 
himself with respect to later proceedings because the information 
received through the records required might be used against the 
defendant in a criminal prosecution for a knowing violation under 
section 113(c)(1).248 This would be a conviction for a different type of 
activity, however, since the criminal penalty is levied only upon viola-
tions "knowingly" made, while the civil penalties apply to other 
violations. As previously mentioned, the Clean Air Act embodies no 
use immunity provision similar to that of the Clean Water Act. 
Because of this omission, the well-reasoned opinion will hold that in-
formation received pursuant to recordkeeping requirements shall 
not be used in any prosecution under section 113(c)(1), the criminal 
penalty provision. 
A court faced with a challenge to the civil penalty sections of the 
Clean Air Act244 on the basis that they violate the litigant's fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination will ultimately have 
to determine whether those penalties are civil or criminal in nature. 
The framework used by the Court in United States v. Ward in resolv-
ing this issue should be applied. The foregoing analysis of the Clean 
Air Act in light of the Ward decision indicates the civil rather then 
criminal or quasi-criminal nature of the Clean Air Act penalties. It is 
therefore constitutionally permissible for information obtained 
through the Clean Air Act recordkeeping provisions to be used by 
the government in assessing civil penalties against violators of the 
Clean Air Act. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Sections of the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts require extensive 
disclosure of information by polluters. Both of these Acts have provi-
sions authorizing information gained through such self-disclosure to 
be used against the alleged polluter by the government to identify 
242. See text and notes at 196-99 supra. 
243. 42 u.s.c. S 7413(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
244. Clean Air Act, SS 113(b), 120, 42 U.S.C. SS 7413(b), 7420 (Supp. III 1979). 
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violators and exact penalties. Such use of information raises ques-
tions with respect to the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination which states that "[n]o person, ... shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." Since 
the fifth amendment privilege applies only to criminal cases, deter-
mining whether a penalty is criminal or civil is of great significance. 
The courts have formulated various criteria in an effort to draw 
the civil-criminal distinction. The Supreme Court in United States v. 
Ward had made this distinction and firmly established the constitu-
tionality of the enforcement and reporting scheme under the oil 
discharge section of the Clean Water Act. In reaching its decision, 
the Court has set up a framework which is likely to be used in future 
cases dealing with a civil versus criminal penalty. Under this frame-
work, the Court examined first whether Congress indicated an inten-
tion to establish a civil or a criminal penalty, and second, where Con-
gress has indicated a civil penalty, whether the sanction was so puni-
tive as to negate that intention. Since other sections of the Clean 
Water Act (dealing with effluent limitations) as well as sections of 
the Clean Air Act provide for extensive self-disclosure which may be 
used to assess civil penalties against violators, the provisions under 
scrutiny in Ward have been compared herein. An analysis has been 
made of the Clean Air Act penalty provisions which may face a fifth 
amendment challenge similar to that in Ward. Using the framework 
established in Ward, it is concluded that the civil penalty provisions 
of the Clean Air Act should withstand constitutional challenge. The 
Ward reasoning should not be limited solely to environmental legis-
lation, but will probably be adopted in other areas as well. 
